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Abstract
In networked markets, information can help firms
make better decisions on which market (platform), and
how much, to participate. However, these markets may
be temporally separated, e.g., independent system operators in different geographical locations. We model
these via networked Cournot markets, but instead consider the participation of one firm to either be with the
realization (or full information) of a random market, or
only with the statistics of the random market, modeled by
an additive zero-mean random variable on the maximal
price. We show that firms not knowing the realization
of the random variable would participate in both markets in the same way as if the mean was realized. We
then present global effects: we prove that profit is improved for every firm when one’s information improves
but social welfare may get better or worst with more information.

1.

Introduction

Markets are increasingly spatially connected and
with efficient supply chain, producers now reach far and
wide to a multitude of consumers and are no longer restricted to their own local consumers. Furthermore, platforms such as eBay and Uber [1] help to connect such
firms to markets in this connected system and guide consumers and producers to make efficient decisions.
Uber assigns price surges in certain geographical regions to ensure that supply is given incentives to meet
demand in an efficient manner [2]. Independent System
Operators (ISOs) play a similar role in the power market and provide incentives to the different participants to
maintain a tradeoff between socially efficient trades and
stability in the system [3, 4], achieving frequency regulation and power line limits as well as maximizing social
welfare.
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To improve efficiency of the grid, many works suggest platforms [5] like Uber or Airbnb for the grid,
where benefits include, e.g., an increased participation
due to small providers such as distributed energy resources (DERs) such as solar, wind, but also controllable
load owners such as smart appliances. The increase in
DERs would help the grid and its participants as well in
terms of line management [6] and in terms of cost, where
the locational marginal prices are less likely to increase
since there is less congested power lines. Another possible benefit is the increased ability to perform frequency
regulation [7] using the enhanced level of controllable
load participation. Other benefits include more competitive prices, and improved economic efficiency.
Besides being spatially (or geographically) connected, some markets are also temporally connected,
and often decisions need to be made at different time
epochs (possibly due to different timezones because of
difference in geographical locations) and therefore may
not always be in a scenario where full information is
available. One example is in the electricity market
where a DER owner has to decide whether to supply
to the current demand or at a later time or different geographical market, where the information in the later time
or the later market may not available in full. In such
cases, it is important to understand how the lack of full
information in later markets (or designed platforms) affects the behavior of less-informed participants, as well
as the other players in the system.
There are two extreme models: (i) to consider the
two markets separately, and (ii) to assume that the firm is
able to participate in both markets simultaneously with
perfect information. While these two extremes represent
possible scenarios, we would like our proposed model to
generalize in terms of the amount of information a firm
has on the later market.
A potential resolution is to have a statistic on the later
market and make an optimal decision on how to participate in the current market, given the statistic on the
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later market and its participants. Potentially, the more
informed a firm is, the lower the variance of its corresponding statistic on the market, and the better the decision it makes. We will show that the above is true,
and also, that when the participant has greater information, competition across the system improves in the right
direction, and the expected revenue of every player increases.

1.1

Networked Cournot Markets

Competition is no longer in a single, well-defined
market scenario and analysis of markets have also
shifted towards networked markets, where firms participate in multiple markets simultaneously.
One of the networked competition models that has
been well studied [8, 9, 10, 11, 12] lately is the networked Cournot competition. Cournot competition, in
contrast to competition by price (Bertrand Competition),
competes by choosing quantities, and the eventual price
is determined by the aggregate supply in each market.
Another motivation of networked Cournot market is
that bidding processes in power markets are similar to
Cournot competition and as such, the Cournot model is
also adopted in the electricity market literature [13].
Furthermore, under mild assumptions, networked
Cournot competition admits a unique Nash equilibrium
[8, 9] and is an ordinal potential game in which the Nash
equilibrium can be obtained via a convex optimization
procedure that has polynomial time complexity [9].
There is no consideration of the temporal factor involved in previous works, and they often assume that
price scenarios remain constant across time, and do not
change. We introduce, in this work, stochasticity in the
market, modeling potential lack of information for the
firms able to participate in both markets.

1.2

Power Markets and Second Chance

Due to different timezones, power markets in distant locations within United States may close at different
time epochs. In particular, generators producing to two
different markets (such as CAISO and PJM) may find it
difficult to optimize over the two markets, given limited
information on the eventual trading price.
By utilizing historical day ahead market bids, firms
can usually obtain a good estimate of the market statistic
but decisions made in the absence of full information are
often suboptimal.
An informal definition for second chance, first introduced in [14], is when a firm is not restricted to one market, and can participate in a second or later market as an
insurance for risky behavior in the first market. Second
chance improves ones’ profit as compared to not being

able to access two markets at the same time.
We model this via temporally connected markets,
and whether we have full information of the later market
(in which case we can effectively take part in both markets), or we do not know the realization of the second
market (in which case there is no second chance and the
firm optimizes over past statistics of the behavior of the
later market, and is unable to use the second market as
an effective source of insurance).
In this work, under stochasticity on the maximal
price of the market, we show that given statistics and for
the firm possibly participating in both markets, it should
participate according to the mean of the random variable, as per intuition. The variance does not play a role
in making optimal decisions as it potentially affects both
in a positive and negative manner. Furthermore, we look
at how second chance can improve the firm’s profit, and
how they affect the profit of other firms in the system.

1.3

Literature Review

Our work builds on, and contributes to, three related
literatures: i) works studying platform design and, ii)
works studying competition in networked markets.
1.3.1. Platform design The widespread success of online platforms has spurred on an increasingly growing
literature focused on understanding the impacts of different designs of platforms and their successes. Work
in this literature has focused on a variety of topics, e.g.
pricing [15], insulation [16] and competition [17] .
Our focus is on distinguishing platforms or markets
based on the information they provide, and this can be
either temporal as in the power market setting, or platform design in general, with the preference of withholding full information.
To this point, no analytic work has studied the impact
of strategic incentives created by information or temporal interactions in online platforms. This paper provides the first such study, using the classical model of
networked Cournot competition as the setting.
1.3.2. Competition in networked settings Networked
competition appears in various forms, including networked Bertrand competition, e.g., [18, 19, 20, 21], networked Cournot competition, e.g., [8, 9, 22], and various
other non-cooperative bargaining games where agents
can trade via bilateral contracts and a network determines the set of feasible trades, e.g., [23, 24, 25, 26, 27].
Our paper fits squarely into the emerging literature
on networked Cournot competition. The model of networked competition we study has been considered previously, beginning with [28] and continuing through
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[22, 8, 9, 29, 10, 11, 12]. The contribution of our work
comes in two forms. Firstly, we show that withholding information in an appropriate manner can preserve
competition, i.e. firms react according to the average
case. If information can be withheld selectively, this
may drive production rates up, which has been shown
by [11, 12] to help improve efficiency in the platform.
Secondly, we also show that every player gains with
one player’s improved information, which is a good evidence towards sharing of knowledge between players in
a truthful manner. In a recent work, [30] showed under a
different model that as variance in market clearing price
increases, the benefit of information also increase.

1.4

Summary

We introduce a novel model in Section 2 for
temporally connected networked Cournot competition,
whereby participants in both markets are only given a
statistic of the later market, the mean and variance of
the maximal price of that market. In Section 3, we show
that the optimal participation in the random market follows according to the participation with the mean of the
random variable, and is independent of the variance of
the random variable. We provide a motivating example
in Section 4, intuiting the behavior of a single firm under
second chance and provide generalizations on the result
and global effects in Section 5 where there is competition, showing that the profit of both firms in the earlier
and later market increase on average. Lastly, we prove
in Section 6 that the firm participating in second chance
always stand to gain from its participation or having increased information, and conclude in Section 8.

2.

s−i to denote the vector (s1 , . . . , si−1 , si+1 , . . . , sn ), and
similarly for q−i, j .
The price in a market is determined by the total supply through a demand function. Following [8], we focus
on linear inverse demand throughout this paper. Specifically, the price p j at market j is given by α j − β j d j ,
where α j and β j are market specific parameters. The
demand curve of market j characterizes the price p j as
a function of demand d j . As in [8], a firm experiences a
production cost that is quadratic in its total production,
i.e., firm i’s cost is ci s2i , with ci being a firm specific parameter. Note that analytical characterizations outside
of linear demand and quadratic production costs are typically difficult. See [9] for a discussion.

Model

This paper adopts the model of networked Cournot
competition introduced by [8] and [9]. This model generalizes classical Cournot competition, in which firms
compete in a single market.
Our interest in this work is in Cournot competition in
a networked setting, and in addition, to consider temporal interactions between firms and markets. Specifically,
we consider a set M of m markets and a set F of n firms
that are connected by a set of edges E ⊆ F × M, where
(i, j) ∈ E represents firm i having access to market j.
For (i, j) ∈ E , the production qi j ≥ 0 is the supply
from firm i to market j. The total production of a firm i
is si = ∑ j:(i, j)∈E qi j , and the total supply at market j
is d j = ∑i:(i, j)∈E qi j . (One can consider qi j = 0 for all
(i, j) ∈
/ E , and from this point on we will drop the range
(i, j) ∈ E for summations.) We use q to represent the
vector of productions (qi j )(i, j)∈E . Additionally, we use

2.1

Temporally Connected Markets Modeled
by Stochasticity

We introduce a slight change that markets can have a
stochastic α (maximal willingness to pay) value, introducing some stochasticity into the model:
p j (d j ) = (α j + z) − β j d j ,
where z is a random variable. The choice of the stochasticity on the maximal willingness to pay α and not the
price elasticity β is because price elasticity in a market
is often kept constant while price peaks occur due to increased demand.
The assumption is that all other firms observe the realization and achieve equilibrium (existence and uniqueness of equilibrium comes from the work of [8, 9]). We
limit our consideration currently to two temporal markets, one earlier and one later, with second chance being
modeled via one firm’s participation in both markets and
knowing the realization of the random variable z while
not participating in second chance implies that the firm
has to make a commitment to the quantity produced for
the later market based on information on z.

3.

Optimization under market uncertainty

When a firm is given only the statistic of the market
behavior (and the information of the reported cost of the
other firms) and wants to make a decision, it optimizes
over the markets it participates in, knowing how its participation would change the equilibrium in each market,
given the realization of random markets.
We hope that the random variable is well-behaved,
where we mean that decisions can be made independent
of the variance of the random variable. We restrict
our consideration to the case where only one firm
potentially participates in second chance, and prove the
following lemma:
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where the expected price in the market is
Lemma 1. When there is only one firm participating
in second chance, the solution of the optimal expected
profit from a market with random α is the solution to the
optimal profit from a market with the mean of α.

sc
Ez [α2 + z − β2 (Sz (qsc
2 ) + q2 )]
sc
= α2 − β2 qsc
2 + Ez [z − β2 (Sz (q2 ))]



new + z
α
2


 
= α2 − β2 qsc
2 + Ez z − β2
1
β2 + ∑ k j
j

β2 αnew
2 
= α2 − β2 qsc
2 −
β2 + ∑ 1k j
j



z

 
+ Ez z − β2 
β2 + ∑ 1k j

Proof. Note first that the quantity that the other firms
produce (observing the realization) can be written in
closed form as a function of the choice of the “second
chance” firm’s quantity to that market.
Given the “second chance” firm’s fixed committed
quantity to that market, the firms equivalently see a marold
ket with αnew
m (qsc ) = αm − βm ∗ qsc . Since each of these
firms only participate in one market, the first order conditions hold and can be written:

f

where S = ∑i=1 qi . and therefore, for any two firms i, k,

(βm + 2ci )qi = (βm + 2ck )qk ,

and so we can write every firms’ quantity as a function
1
of the quantity of the first firm q1 , i.e. qi = ββmm+2c
+2ci q1 ,
2ci

)−1 ,

(βm +2ci )−1
S.
∑k∈m [(βm +2ck )−1 ]

Denote ki = (βm +

then we have that:

S(qsc
m) =

αnew

,
βm + ∑ 1k j
j

old
sc
where αnew
m = αm − βm qm . Note that optimizing based
on the expected profit over the variable z, we have:

max qsc
(α1 − β1 (S1 (qsc
) + qsc
1 )) +
|1
{z 1
}

sc
qsc
1 ,q2

revenue from first market

sc
sc
+ qsc
2 Ez [α2 + z − β2 (Sz (q2 ) + q2 )]
|
{z
}
price in market

sc 2
− c(qsc
1 + q2 )

j

β2 αnew
2 
= α2 − β2 qsc
2 −
β2 + ∑ 1k j
j
|
{z
}
price of market with z=0

and we have that the optimal action to take is to maximize based on the mean of the random variable. Therefore, optimizing over this randomness results in reacting
in a Nash sense to a game without randomness where
the firm is given only the mean.

αnew
m − βm S − βm qi = 2ci qi ,

and therefore qi =

(2)

(1)

While the proof and lemma above is for the one firm
case, the proof trivially extends to the multi-firm case
participating in both, where they would both still react
according to the mean, even if they are given different
variances.

4.

Motivating Example: Second chance in
the absence of competition

To provide intuition, we start out with the one firm,
two market case, whereby the first market is deterministic and the second market is random and in this example,
we assume that the random variable z is bernoulli, and
defined in the following manner:
(
1
with probability 12
z=
−1 with probability 12
As we already know from the preceding section, the optimal solution with no knowledge of the realization is to
allocate quantities according to the mean, i.e. E[z] = 0.
On the other hand, for second chance, the optimal solution is with knowledge of realizations. We first compute the amount that the firm commits to the second
market when there is no knowledge of the realization.
Note that in general, the second chance firm contributes
a non-zero aggregate supply to both markets, and that
implies that all first order conditions are active. We list
here some other possibilities:
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1. q1 > 0, q2 > 0, q2 > 0, qb2 > 0. This corresponds to
the traditional case whereby participation to each
market regardless of the market conditions remain
active, and all first order conditions hold. In particular, the following equation, summarizing the first
order conditions, hold true.

q
q2

2c(q1 + q2 ) = α1 − 2β1 q1 = α2 − 2β2 q2
which gives us that aggregate supply s can be written:
s = q1 + q2 =

α1 β2 + α2 β1
2(cβ1 + cβ2 + β1 β2 )

which allow us to find that the equilibrium quantities at each market with no second chance will be
as follow:
q1 =

1
1
(α1 − 2cs) , q2 =
(α2 − 2cs)
2β1
2β2

with corresponding prices in each market as:
1
1
(α1 + 2cs) , p2 = (α2 + 2cs) ,
2
2
Then, the profit of the firm can be written as:
p1 =

Π=

1
1
(α21 − 4c2 s2 ) +
(α2 − 4c2 s2 ) − cs2
4β1
4β2 2

Similarly, under second chance or full information,
the good profit and bad profit can be written by re−
placing α2 with α2 ± 1, denoted α+
2 , α2 :
1
1
(α2 − 4c2 s2g ) +
[(α+ )2 − 4c2 s2g ] − cs2g
4β1 1
4β2 2
1
1
Πb =
(α21 − 4c2 s2b ) +
[(α− )2 − 4c2 s2b ] − cs2b
4β1
4β2 2
Πg =

where sg = s +

β1
2(cβ1 +cβ2 +β1 β2 )

and sb = s −

β1
2(cβ1 +cβ2 +β1 β2 )

and the profit from second chance
is its expectation over all possible realizations
Π(sc) = 12 (Πg + Πb ), and now we show that Π(sc) >
Π, where Π as we know from the preceding section
equals that when the firm optimizes without knowledge of the realization of z:
Π(sc) − Π =

with

s2g +s2b
2

s2g + s2b
1
[−4c2 (
− s2 )]
4β1
2
s2g + s2b
1
+
[1 − 4c2 (
− s2 )]
4β2
2
s2g + s2b
− c(
− s2 )
2
>0

− s2 < 0 following from convexity.

q1

α2

α2-1 αc α2 α’ α2+1
g

Figure 1: Scenario 2: q1 > 0, q2 > 0, q2 > 0, qb2 = 0.
Second market is participated in the good setting
and in the mean case but not under the bad setting.
g

2. q1 > 0, q2 > 0, q2 > 0, qb2 = 0. In this case, when the
market returns in the bad case, the firm, if participating in second chance, chooses not to participate
at all. One can still follow the pipeline of the previous analysis, and find that q1 is linearly decreasing
in α2 while q2 the opposite if q1 , q2 > 0. However,
we are discussing here a particular case where q2
reduces to zero when α2 is small enough, say, falls
below a threshold αc , as Fig. 1 shows.
Conspicuously, under this circumstance we have
Πg + Πb
Πα2 +1 + Πα2 −1
Πα2 +1 + Παc
=
=
2
2
2
Πα0 + Παc
≥
> Πα2 = Π
2

Πsc =

where α0 = 2α2 − αc . The third equation holds as
the market equilibrium (single-firm-single-market
equilibrium) remains invariant for any α2 ≤ αc .
The fourth inequality is always true since Π is
monotonically increasing in α2 . Finally the fifth
inequality follows the conclusion of the previous
case.
g
3. q1 > 0, q2 = 0, q2 > 0, qb2 = 0. This is basically another situation that follows case 2, as illustrated in
Fig. 2. With both α2 − 1 and α2 , the firm only parg
ticipates in the first market, i.e., q1 > 0, q2 = 0, q2 >
b
0, q2 = 0. Since Πb = Πα2 −1 = Παc = Πα2 = Π, inΠ +Π
tuitively Πsc = g 2 b > Π.
g
4. q1 > 0, q2 = 0, q2 = 0, qb2 = 0
The firm only participates in the first market and ignore the second one regardless of α2 , it will neither
gain nor lose.
g
5. q1 = 0, q2 > 0, q2 > 0, qb2 > 0
The firm only participates in the second market and
ignore the first one regardless of α2 , thus
α2
s = q2 =
2(c + β2 )
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general now, we show that in markets that have firms
that participate in only one market, as α increases,
we show that profits in every firm does too. Again,
while we show this for the case where only one firm
potentially participates in second chance, this extends
(in a tedious manner) to the case where multiple firms
participate in second chance together.

q2

q1
α2-1

α2

α2 αc α2+1
g

Figure 2: Scenario 3: q1 > 0, q2 = 0, q2 > 0, qb2 = 0.
Second market is participated in the good setting
but not in the mean case nor the bad setting.

with price
p2 = α2 − β2 s

Lemma 2. In a single market, with firms participating only in that particular market, as α increases, every
firm’s revenue increase, and vice versa. In particular, it
increases as a quadratic function of the variable α.
Proof. Firstly, note from the above analysis that when
every firm participates only in that market, the quantity
can be written:
ki
S
qi =
∑j kj
where ki = (β + 2ci )−1 and

We can therefore have
Π = α2 s − β2 s2 − cs2

S=

α
β + ∑1k j

Similarly,
where the eventual price of the market is:
Πg = (α2 + 1)sg − β2 s2g − cs2g

p(α) = α − βS

Πb = (α2 − 1)sb − β2 s2b − cs2b
where sg = s +
trivial to verify

1
2(c+β2 )

and sb = s −

1
2(c+β2 ) .

= α−
It is

s2g + s2b
1
Π −Π =
− (β2 + c)(
− s2 ) > 0
2(c + β2 )
2

=

sc

s2g +s2b
2

since
− s2 < 0 holds through convexity.
To sum up, excluding case 4 where we can ignore the
second market a priori, profit is expected to increase and
the firm stands to gain with second chance. Note that
with this analysis, we also know that on average, profit
increases in this non-competition case as long as z is
governed by a symmetric probability distribution with
mean 0, i.e., the p.d.f. of the function is symmetric
around 0.
In the succeeding sections, we will make the assumption that the first order conditions hold true with equality, i.e. every link is active which implies that in every
scenario, the firm would always participate in the market
it is linked to.

5.

Global Effects on other Firms

We have already noticed that participation in second
chance changes the α value that the other firms see. In

αβ
β + ∑1k j

α
∑kj

β + ∑1k j

We can write the revenue of the firm as a function of
the maximal willingness to pay in each market α:
!
α
Ri (α) = qi

∑kj

β + ∑1k j

ki
=
∑j kj

α
β + ∑1k j

!

=

ki
(∑ j k j )2

=

α2 ki
(∑ j k j )2 (β + ∑1k j )2

α
β + ∑1k j

α
∑kj

!

β + ∑1k j
!
!
α
β + ∑1k j

and we see that as α increases, the revenue at equilibrium for each firm increases, and if α decreases, then the
revenue at equilibrium for each firm decreases. Moreover, we note that revenue of each of these firms can be
written as a quadratic function of α.
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Lemma 3. Given α1 , α2 , the middle firm participates
in each market with the corresponding quantities:

 

α1 M1 1 + β cM − α2 βc
2

 2 2
q1 =
c
2β1 M1 1 + β M + 2c
2 2


 
c
α2 M2 1 + β M − α1 βc
1

 1 1
q2 =
c
2β2 M2 1 + β M + 2c
1



 βm
 .
βm + ∑ 1 k
j∈m j

In particular, this participation is linear in terms of
α2 , and therefore any change in α2 would correspondingly result in a linear change in the αnew
seen by the
2
other firms.
Proof. When only one firm participates in second
chance, then it knows exactly how the other firms will
react according to the equation:
Sm (qm ) =

Effects on the other participants in the
later market

Lemma 4. The αnew
observed by the other firms in the
2
second market can be written as:

 


αobs
M2 1 + β cM − α1 βc
2
1


 1 1 
αreal
2 − β2
2β2 M2 1 + β cM + 2c
1

1

1



where Mm = 1 −

5.1

αm − βm qm


βm + ∑ 1 k j
j∈m

and price at each market can correspondingly be written:

where αreal
is the realized α2 and αobs
2
2 is what the middle firm observes, and is dependent on whether there is
second chance or not. Regardless, αnew
2 is a linear function of α2 .
Proof. Follows from the result in the preceding Lemma.

When there is no second chance, the quantity that the
middle firm produces for each market remains fixed as
qm (α2 ), while if there is second chance, then the quantity produced is a function of the realized random variable qm (α2 + z).
In particular,

 


(α2 + z)M2 1 + β cM − α1 βc
1 1
1
,



αsc
2 = α2 +z−β2
c
2β2 M2 1 + β M + 2c
1

1

pm (qm ) = αm − βm Sm (qm ) − βqm
and
and the optimal profit problem can be written:



 
α2 M2 1 + β cM − α1 βc
1

,
 1 1

αnsc
2 = α2 + z − β2
c
2β2 M2 1 + β M + 2c


max q1 p1 (q1 ) + q2 p2 (q2 ) − c(q1 + q2 )2
q1 ,q2

1

and taking derivatives with respect to qm , we get:


β

m
2c(qm + q−m ) = (αm − 2βm qm ) 1 −
βm + ∑ 1 k j

and expected revenue increase can be written as:


ki
2
nsc 2
E (αsc
2 ) − (α2 )
1 2 z
2
(∑ j k j ) (β2 + ∑ k j )

j∈m


i.e. setting Mm = 1 −

and can be simplified to be:


βm
 ,
βm + ∑ 1k

we can write:


ki 
2P + P2 · Var[z]
L2

j j



 
α1 M1 1 + β cM − α2 βc
2
 2 2

q1 =
c
2β1 M1 1 + β M + 2c
2

where
(3)

Lm = ( ∑ k j )2 βm +

2

j∈m



 
α2 M2 1 + β cM − α1 βc
1
 1 1

q2 =
c
2β2 M2 1 + β M + 2c
1

1

1

(4)

1

2

∑ j∈m k j

and


β2 M2 1 + β cM
1 1


P=
c
2β2 M2 1 + β M + 2c
1

1
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When there is second chance, qi as a function of z can
be written:

  !!

(α2 +z)M2 1+ β cM −α1 βc
1
 1 1 
2β2 M2 1+ β cM +2c

ki α2 + z − β2
qsc
i =

1 1


(∑ j∈m k j ) β2 + ∑

1



j∈m k j

while when there is no second chance, the participation
of the middle firm becomes fixed and qi as a function of
z becomes:


  !!
ki α2 + z − β2
qnsc
i =

α2 M2 1+ β cM −α1 βc
1

1 1
2β2 M2 1+ β cM +2c

1 1


(∑ j∈m k j ) β2 + ∑ 1 k j
j∈m

2
and we are interested in the quantity E[ci (qsc
i ) ]−
2
nsc
(E[ci (qi ) ]):
2
nsc 2
E[ci (qsc
i ) ] − (E[ci (qi ) ]) = ci




ki2 (2P + P2 )
Var[z]
L2

and whether a profit is made depends on whether:
ki − ci ki2

> 0 ⇐⇒ 1 > ci ki

How does the random variable z affect αnew
1 ? From
Lemma 5, we can see that as changes in z reflect in linear changes in αnew
1 in the opposite direction. Unlike the
previous subsection, here we only have an indirect effect
and no direct effect. When the middle firm participates
in second chance, the coefficient of the quadratic term
of z can be written:
2
 
c
ki  


 β2
β1
L1
+ 2c
2β M 1 + c
1

β2 M2

On the other hand, if the middle firm does not, then there
is no effect on the earlier market, and therefore with second chance, revenue increases by:
 
2
c
ki  
 · Var[z]

 β2
β1
c
L1
+ 2c
2β M 1 +
1

1

β2 M2

On the other hand, we can write the difference in cost:
 
2
c
2
ci ki  
 · Var[z]
 β2

β1
L1
2β M 1 + c
+ 2c
1

1

β2 M2

and whether a profit is made depends on whether:

ci
β+2ci

< 12 , and therefore, we obtain the
but ci ki =
following theorem:

1

ki − ci ki2 > 0 ⇐⇒ 1 > ci ki
but ci ki =

ci
β+2ci

< 21 , and we get the following theorem:

Theorem 5. A profit is always made by the other firms in
the random (later) market under increased information
or second chance.

Theorem 7. A profit is always made by the other firms
in the fixed (earlier) market under second chance.

5.2

6.

Effects on the other participants in the earlier market

Lemma 6. The αnew
observed by the other firms in the
1
first market can be written as:


 

c
α1 M1 1 + β cM − αobs
2
β2
2 2




α1 − β1
2β1 M1 1 + β cM + 2c
2

2

and consequently, αnew
1 is a linear function of α2 , with a
positive coefficient, indicating that as α2 increases (decreases), αnew
also increases (decreases).
1
Proof. Follows from the result in Lemma 3.
Similar to before, the revenue of each firm participating in the first market can be written:
Ri (αnew
1 )=

2
(αnew
1 ) ki
(∑ j k j )2 (β1 + ∑1k j )2

Benefits of Participation in Second
Chance

We restrict ourselves, as we did in the previous sections, in cases where only one firm has the option to
participate in Second Chance. The question we want to
ask in this section is whether it is always the case, as it is
with the motivating examples in Section 4, that the firm
with the opportunity to participate in second chance improves profit through participation. Recall from the previous section that we already have closed form solutions
for the firm’s participation in the two markets dependent on the whether it participates in Second Chance.
Firstly, it is important to note that the eventual price of
the two markets is linearly dependent of the firm’s participation (since the αm seen here is linearly dependent
on the firm’s participation), and can be written:
pm (qm ) = αm − βm

αm − βm qm

 − βm qm
βm + ∑ 1 k j
j∈m
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Similar to before in Section 4, we can write:

3.5

M2 (A + c)
−M2 c
, δ2 =
δ1 =
2AB + 2Ac + 2Bc
2AB + 2Ac + 2Bc
where A = β1 M1 and B = β2 M2 , and again, we can have:

3

2.5

SWSC /SWNSC

∆p1 = −Aδ1 , ∆p2 = −Bδ2 + M2
and similar to before,
(sc)

Π

2

1.5

2

− Π =∆p1 δ1 + ∆p2 δ2 − c(δ1 + δ2 )

1

=D[−Ac2 − B(A + c)2
0.5

+ 2(A + c)(AB + Ac + Bc) − cA2 ]
0

=D[(A + c)(AB + Ac + Bc)] > 0
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2
since D = 2(AB+Ac+Bc)
2 > 0, and therefore profit increases in the general case, as compared to the illustration in section 4, culminating in the following theorem:
Theorem 8. Every firm improves its profit when the firm
exercises second chance, i.e., more information for one
firm is beneficial for all parties in this system.

Figure 3: Simulations illustrating the range of social
welfare obtained, possibly better or worse with
additional information. The results are sorted for
the reader’s convenience.

8.
7.

Effects of Information on Social Welfare

An interesting direction for this work is whether
withheld information or information asymmetry can improve social welfare. We perform simulations where
there is one firm potentially participating in second
chance, and we are interested in the ratio of the social
welfare obtained with and without second chance.
In this set of simulations, we consider the case where
there are three firms in total, one firm participating in
each of the two markets exclusively and one firm participating in both markets. We assume that z is bernoulli as
defined in section 4. Similar to our analysis, we are interested in the case where there are two markets and the
choice of three firms is firstly the smallest to represent
this setting and because firms in a particular knowledge
group can be aggregated and seen as one firm.
Is the social welfare, alike to the individual profits,
always increasing with second chance? Given results
from [11], social welfare at Nash usually suffers due to
decreased production levels, and information withheld
may improve or degrade production levels, and therefore
could potentially be used to improve social welfare.
Under 10000 simulated scenarios as described above
with the parameters α, β, and c being chosen uniformly
at random, we plot in Fig.3 the ratio between the average social welfare obtained with and without second
chance. As anticipated, the ratio ranges from roughly 14
to 4, signifying that the average social welfare can possibly be improved (but also possibly made worse) under
information asymmetry.

Conclusion and Future Work

In this work, we introduce stochasticity in Networked Cournot Competition to take into account markets at different times, such as between geographical locations at distinct timezones or even between day-ahead
or real-time trading in power markets.
Emphasizing on power markets, we focus on the
two market case and include stochasticity in the second
(later) market. We consider one firm potentially being
able to access the two markets, in two different cases:
(i) the firm knows the statistics of the random variable,
and (ii) the firm realizes the random variable.
We find that with second chance or with precise information, both the firm involved and the other firms in
the system increase their expected profit.
Lastly, we also show simulations that demonstrate
that withholding information can make the system better or worse in terms of social welfare, and the careful
design of how to and to whom to withhold information
from is a good future direction to consider.
Another interesting direction to consider is incorporating different costs of participating in distinct markets.
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